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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Alabama, by statute45 and case law'4 6 has also developed a
broad standard for judicial review of tax assessments. The court
is authorized to decide "both as to the legality of the assessment
and the amount thereof."4 7 The Supreme Court of Alabama in
a recent decision, stated that the appellant only must sufficiently
show that the assessment was incorrect, to sustain his burden on
judicial review.
4 8
There remains yet another choice that could be used to change
the result of the decision in the instant case. That choice is for
the Legislature to take. The Legislature has at least three courses
of action that could be taken. First, it could by statute, apply the
Alabama approach49 mentioned above. This choice would alleviate
the necessity of reorganizing the administrative procedure of the
county boards. Second, the State Administrative Procedure Act 50
could be made applicable to the county boards. This choice would
at least give hearings and their procedure courtroom formality.
Third, a totally new system could be initiated. This alternative could
be in the form of independent tax review boards, 51 now found in
many of the states.
In conclusion, it is imperative that action be taken to alleviate
the situation created by the instant case. One can only query how
an informed Supreme Court could reach a result that has such po-
tential for injustice. However, it matters very little if this defect
is remedied by the court or legislature, as long as action is taken.
The taxpayers of North Dakota deserve a more equitable system
of review of property tax assessments than their Supreme Court
has chosen to give them.
STEVEN L. WOOD
LICENSING-SALES TAX-RIGHT OF A STATE TO LEVY A SALES TAX
ON ITS OWN SUBCONTRACTOR-The plaintiffs in this case are the
executive vice president of the Minnesota Asphalt Pavement Associ-
ation and a highway construction company. Defendants are the com-
missioner of highways, commissioner of taxation, and the state audi-
45. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 14.0 (1958).
46. Monroe Bond and Mortgage Co. v. State, 254 Ala. 278, 48 So.2d 431 (1950).
47. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 140- (1958).
48. State v. City Wholesale Grocery Co., 283 Ala. 426, 218 So.2d 140 (1969).
49. See discussion aupra.
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01 (1960).
51. (Independent Tax Review Boards typically consist of 3 to 5 members, with diverse
political affiliations, who have a required degree of expertise in Taxation Law, and are
given quasi-Judicial powers to hear tax appeals. See, e.g., Kansas K.S.A. 74-2433 (1969),
and New Jersey N.J.S.A. 54:2-3 (1960).
RECENT CASES
tor. The plaintiffs charge that MINNESOTA STATUTE, subdivision 4 of
section 297A-25 is unconstitutional as a violation of the Minnesota
constitutional section providing for a trunk highway fund.1 Accord-
ing to this section the trunk funds are to be employed only for
the creation, construction, improvement or maintenance of a state
highway system.2 Attack on subdivision 4 is twofold: first the plain-
tiffs assert that it is unconstitutional as applied to state purchases.
Going further the plaintiffs say that subdivision 4 is not severable
within itself and since it is agreed to be unconstitutional as to state
purchases then it must also be unconstitutional as to those purchases
made by individual contractors who sell their finished product to
the state. Secondly, assuming that the provision is found to be sever-
able and consequently unconstitutional as to state purchases it never-
theless remains violative of the trunk fund provisions. Of necessity
contractors would include anticipated materials sales tax as an item
of expense in preparing bids for state jobs. Upon accepting the bids
state trunk funds would be committed to the project and thus the
state would indirectly absorb the sales tax.
In response the defendants denied that merely by contracting
for highway projects does the state assume any sales tax. They
assert that the tax is upon the contractors' purchases-not upon
those of the state.
Considerations before the court were: (1) Is subdivision 4 a sev-
erable provision? (2) Is subdivision 4 unconstitutional as to state
purchases? (3) Is an application of subdivision 4 to contractors only,
nevertheless a misappropriation of trunk funds?
Deliberating upon these issues the Minnesota Supreme Court
in 1969 found the whole of subdivision 4 unconstitutional. The defend-
ants obtained a rehearing in December of 1970. Withdrawing its
prior decision the court held that the application of the statute was
severable and valid as to purchases by contractors but unconstitu-
tional as to separate state purchases. Hoene v. Jamieson, 182 N.W.2d
834 (Minn. 1970).
The court in finding the provision to be severable noted that
only in subdivision 4 is there any mention of contractor exemption
and that its inclusion therein is surplusage to the true intent of
§ 297A-25 when considered in toto. 3 MINNESOTA STATUTE § 297A-25,
subdivision 1 (h) states in part that:
The gross receipts from the sale of and the storage, use, or
consumption of all materials, including chemicals, fuels, pe-
troleum products, lubricants, packaging materials, feeds,
I. MINN. CONST. art. 16 § 7 (Supp. 1956).
2. MINX. CONST. art. 16 §2 (Supp. 1956).
3. Hoene v. Janieson, 182 N.W.2d 834 at 837.
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seeds, fertilizers, electricity, gas and steam, used or consumed
in agriculture or industrial production of personal property
intended to be sold ultimately at retail, whether or not the
item so used becomes an ingredient or constituent part of the
property produced . . . shall be exempt from the Minnesota
sales tax.
4
Subdivision 1 (j) of the same section further exempts:
The gross receipts from all sales of tangible personal prop-
erty to, and all storage, use or consumption of such property
by, the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities
or the state of Minnesota and its agencies, instrumentalities
and political subdivisions.
5
These two provisions would have been all encompassing except
for the exclusionary provisions of subdivision 4 of the same section:
Nothing herein shall exempt the gross receipts from sales
of road building materials intended for use in state trunk
highway or interstate highway construction, whether purchas-
ed by the state or its contractors.6
Special attention should at this time be given to the wording of
the above clause. It implies that regardless of whether the purchase
is made by the state or an independent contractor the sale is subject
to a state sales tax. This section insofar as it includes state purchases
is in conflict with subdivision 1 (j) which specifically exempts all
state purchases from any sales tax. The resolution of this conflict
is the problem in the instant case.
Recalling subdivision 1 (j) the reader will note that it specifically
exempts the state of Minnesota and its instrumentalities from any
incidence of sales tax. This provision would be neutralized with respect
to state highway projects if subdivision 4 were literally read as
a complete exemption of materials used by the state itself. The
motivation behind the enactment of subdivision 4 was not to extin-
guish state exemption, but rather to take advantage of the federal
government involvement in highway projects. 7 The reason, in other
words, was to retain federally purchased materials as a taxable
item. All other U. S. government purchases are previously exempt
by the provisions of 1 (j). Such exemption was not however, previously
afforded to contractors and in view of the rationale for subdivision
4's enactment there is no reason to exonerate them from the tax.
The court in the instant case summarily found the tax unconstitu-
4. MiNx. STAT. ANN. § 297A-25, subdlv. 1(h) (1965 amend.).
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A-25, subdiv. I(J) (1965 amend.).
6. MrNw. STAT. ANN. § 297A-25, subdiv. 4 (1965 amend.).
7. 182 N.W.2d at 838.
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tional as to state purchases simply saying that a contrary result
would be violative of the trunk fund provisions. 8
With respect to subdivision 4's continued applicability as to high-
way contractors the Minnesota Supreme Court follows a long line
of precedent in its reasoning.9 However, the cases relied upon involve
for the most part, not the question of taxing a state employed con-
tractor, but rather, the imposition of such tax upon a federally em-
ployed contractor. The court's holding regarding subdivision 4's in-
validity as applied to direct state purchases and the question of
severability are beyond the scope of this comment which will be
limited to a consideration of the provision's validity as applied to
independent contractor purchases.
At first glance it is obvious that any sales tax imposed upon
a contractor engaged in state projects will eventually be passed
on to the state itself. But as the instant case points out, the tax
must be considered simply an item of overhead-"a cost of doing
business."' 1 This is not a radical approach. Property taxes and
a myriad of other overhead expenses are always assumed by the
contractor when involved in job bidding.1 Sales taxes are just as
susceptible of assimilation into overhead as are the other expenses.
12
Tax liability has traditionally been considered one of the burdens
a citizen must assume in return for the protection of the state. 3
Contractors, then, must bear their part of this burden. To this end
it has been recognized that in regards to agents of the federal govern-
ment the states may validly tax.14 In fact the reciprocal rights
of the state and federal governments to tax certain agents of each
other has been recognized under certain conditions. The United States
Supreme Court in setting a limitation on this right said that the
tax in its mutual effect "... must receive a practical construction
which permits both [governments] to function with the minimum
of interference . . .",15 with each other.
Ordinarily any tax imposed directly upon the federal government
is invalid.16 "Direct" in this connotation has been held to mean:
a tax levied upon governmental property or officers;' 7 or a tax
levied upon a contract of the government. 18 These criteria, originally
established on questions of a state's power to tax federal agencies,
8. Id. at 839-40.
9. See, Annot., 114 A.L.R. 318 (1938).
10. 182 N.W.2d at 839.
11. Id.
12. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 159 (1937).
13. Welch v. Henery, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938).
14. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 154, (1937).
15. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926).
16. McCullouch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 326-27 (1819).
17. Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 449-50 (1842).
18. Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 859-71 (1824).
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have been extended to determinations of the state's power to tax
state agencies. Recognition of this transposition is evidenced by
the applicable tax statutes of the states. Representative of these
are MINNESOTA STATUTE, § 297A-25, subdivision 1 (j) 19 and NORTH DA-
KOTA CENTURY CODE provision 57-39.2-04 subdiv. (6) which states:
There are specifically exempted (from sales tax) the gross
receipts from all sales . . to the United States or any state
thereof, including the state of North Dakota, or any of the sub-
divisions, departments, agencies or institutions thereof.2 0
The applicability of a tax to a contractor depends upon two
things, first, the relationship of the taxable subject to the governing
entity and secondly, the effect of this tax upon the governing body.
The question then, is whether a contractor employed by a state may
constitutionally be made subject to the state sales tax. In answering
this question the Minnesota Supreme Court in the instant case used
the "direct" test and said that determination of the tax validity
depends upon the extent of the economic impact wrought upon the
state.2
1
The whole subject of tax impact upon the government is difficult
to resolve. With respect to the direct effect theory one approach
has been to determine relationship of the tax subject to the govern-
ment.,2 2 Another way of expressing the same idea is to put the
question into terms of "independent" vs. "dependent" functions. There
is no question as to the dependency of U.S. ship yards, Postal depart-
ment or Atomic Energy Commission upon the federal government.
Likewise, state fish and game departments etc. are dependents of
the state government. Clearly these institutions do not operate in
and of themselves and any tax upon them would be violative of
the respective statutory exemptions.
Beyond these easily distinguishable relationships lies a very broad
class of business entities whose relationship is not so easily discern-
ible. Independent contractors involved in governmental construction
projects are among these.
For a brief idea of how courts have resolved this relationship
question consider the following two examples. Contractors involved
in army camp construction in Alabama sought to avoid the Alabama
use tax by claiming exemption under the Alabama statute similar
to the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE provision.2 3 The United States
Supreme Court in this case said that the contractors were not agents
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A-25, subdiv. 1(j) (1965 amend.).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-04, subdiv. 6 (Supp. 1969).
21. 182 N.W.2d at 837.
22. James v. Dravo Conracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 154 (1937).
23. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1941); CODE op ALA. Title 51, § 789
(194,0) ; CoDE r ATA Title 51 § 786 (34) (1959).
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or instrumentalities of the federal government and thus remained
liable as if the contract had been with a private party. 24 Although the
government may ultimately have been the recipient of the finished
camps, under a cost-plus contract such result is not determinative of
taxability. A more straight forward expression of contractor immunity
is found in Boeing Company v. Omdahl.25 This case involved a suit
by a federally employed contractor against the state of North Dakota.
In argument the plaintiff company contended that at the time of its
purchases it was an agent of the United States government. As a con-
sequence, the federal government was in fact the purchaser and
thereby the federal exemption from the sales tax shifts to the con-
tracting company. 26 The North Dakota Supreme Court, after examin-
ing the contractual provisions, found that the contractor was the
actual purchaser. Proof of this result arose from the evidence of the
contractor's inability to pledge government credit and its great dis-
cretion in financing and purchasing. 27 Basing its holding upon the
above findings the court said that:
Even though title vests immediately in the United States,
that is not conclusive of ownership for tax purposes when it
appears that the taxpayer retains the essential indicia of own-
ership. 28
Where the materials are ordered by the contractor, paid for by him
and the government incurs a reimbursement obligation only upon
delivery, inspection and acceptance there is no tax immune relation-
ship.
2 9
Although there may be an insufficient relationship between the
government and its contractor to establish contractor immunity, the
effect of the tax may be of such a nature as to be burdensome
to the government. This is another criteria for the determination
of tax "directness." With respect to tax effect the North Dakota
Supreme Court has announced the test to be one of "legal incidence."80
Who is legally obligated to pay for the goods? If the contractor
defaults does the ultimate liability rest with the government sponsor?
If so then the tax is invalid as a burden upon the government.
Variants of this test have been employed 'by other state jurisdictions
but in a different context.2 1
Apparently the fact that the sales tax is ultimately passed on
24. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1941).
25. Boeing Co. v. Omdahl, 169 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 1969).
26. Id. at 701.
27. Id. at 705-06.
28. Id. at 707.
29. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1941).
30. Boeing Company v. Omdahl, 169 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 1969).
31. Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 518, 125 P.2d
4C8 (1942), J. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga. App. 683, 80 S.E.2d 86 (1954).
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to the taxing state is not enough to distinguish these cases from
situations wherein the tax is passed on to the federal government.
Directness of the tax effect remains the paramount issue in both.
State courts have sought to answer the question by a determina-
tion of who is the consumer and who is the user. 2 Once it is shown
that the contractor is the consumer then he is liable for the tax
regardless of the finished product's ultimate destiny. North Dakota
arrived at this result in a case in which the contractor was engaged
in construction work for the state and its tax exempt agencies.33
The plaintiff in that case, relying upon subdivision 6 of § 57-39.2-04
of the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE contended that he was merely a
retailer and that the tax-immune state agency was the consumer.3 4
The court said that all component parts of an end product are subject
to a sales tax.
The various court interpretations of sales tax immunity statutes
are in general agreement. While the theories may use different words,
the underlying basis for determining tax immunity of state employed
contractors remains virtually the same throughout all jurisdictions.
State adoption of the early U.S. Supreme Court guidelines of tax
immunity has resulted in some rather clear rules. Employment by
the state is not enough in itself to render the contractor immune.
There must either be a close relationship between the contractor
and the state or, a significant effect wrought upon the state by
the contractor's tax liability. It seems clear that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court was correct in applying the sales tax to state-employed
contractors. The validity of this decision is even more apparent in
light of similar holdings in both state and federal courts.
WILLIAM A. HILL
32. J. W. Medors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga. App. 583, 80 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1954).
84. Northern Improvement Company v. Engen, 68 N.W.2d 463 (N.D. 1954).
34. Id. at 466.
